05-22-2014, 01:55 AM
(This post was last modified: 05-22-2014, 01:56 AM by Adonai One.)
Quote:...It is noteworthy that many of Aristotle’s arguments in Metaphysics Γ in favor of the principle of non contradiction are rather arguments against trivialism. In particular, there is a family of arguments between 1008 a 26 and 1007 b 12 of the form “If trivialism is right, then X is the case, but if X is the case then all things are one. But it is impossible that all things are one, so trivialism is impossible.” Seemingly, these Aristotelian considerations are the seeds of virtually all subsequent suspicions against trivialism: Trivialism has to be rejected because it identifies what should not be identified, and is undesirable from a logical point of view because it identifies what is not identical, namely, truth and falsehood...
Models of Possibilism and Trivialism, Luis Estrada-González, Page 193
http://wydawnictwoumk.pl/czasopisma/inde...e/view/791
I found it directly mentioned, yay!