Bring4th

After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

Hello KevinAir!

Welcome.

You have read the Law of One to the end, but I have trouble because each time I get close to the end, I end up talking about it with friends.
These friends point out flaws in the ideas I share, so I go back to better understand. I find each time I read from the beginning, I learn more than I did the last time.

The Creator is not an entity of finite qualities. Because the Creator is infinite, it is impossible ascribe this entity qualities that might it could be lacking in. It is impossible for it to be lacking sympathy or compassion, for example. It is also illogical to consider any entity outside of the interests of the Creator, for all is one.

This life of ours on this Earth are not meant to be one of understanding. The Law of Confusion and the veil are good evidence of this, I think.

I hope that what I say is of help. I cannot say I am a master or wise, as I am still reading the Law of One. It takes me days sometimes to digest something I read.

Cheers!

Hi Foha!
thanks for the reply. I am having trouble I think with..."because the creator is infinite, it is impossible to ascribe this entity qualities it could be lacking in." How do we know this? How? If it is an infinite creator, then somewhere along the line finite-ness has to show up, doesn't it?
I agree understanding is beyond us. But my former years in getting the crap kicked out of me in Christianity have shown my that faith is an unreliable way to finding truth. I can't just start to worship and adore and praise a creator who is nameless and faceless. Christianity is a nightmare. I just want some proof. I am more inclined to believe what I am reading here. Many of the sessions talk about faith. This discourages me due to my experience in the christian church and with those that profess christianity. I make a lousy atheist...I want to believe. I need that.

I can feel your discomfort, KA, and I wish there were some way I could directly assist you, but your quest seems deeply personal, and deeply within your person.  I would, however, encourage you fully to continue your rambles until you find outer understanding that begins to match your inner faith.

Because of its violent history, Christianity is a religion where the confession of faith is of great importance.  Whether or not you believe that Christ was true man or true God, for example, often determined whether you were let alone or killed.  

The message of the Ra Material is rather different.  There is no compulsion to accept as axiomatic any particular ideas.  That's all a personal choice.  On the other hand, if you're seeking a framework from which to try to understand multi-dimensional reality, then the literature can be quite useful.  So, take it for what it may be worth to you.

Lastly, I might encourage you to take your time before deciding the ultimate nature of the One Creator or your own ultimate identity.  Give yourself space to allow your own inner vibrations to be known to you.  From there you can begin to consider how reality is constructed.  It all begins with silence, not with bustle and noise.

 

KevinAir, have you read Spinoza's The Ethics?

Perhaps it will lend some logic behind a lot of these assertions.

I have heard of it. Will look into asap! Thank you!

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

Hi KevinAir,

Are you "an entity that is utter STS"?  I ask this rhetorical question because, guess what?  You are the Creator, temporarily pretending to be "KevinAir" by assuming this particular identity much in the way you might assume a character in a role-playing game, but with infinitely more nuance and depth of experience as that character. 

At the same time, the Creator is assuming and playing out the roles of every other entity in existence, from the smallest atom to the Logos itself.  ALL are faces of the Creator, taking on a particular role, a particular set of attributes and limitations in order to explore what it's like to be, say, KevinAir for a little while.

Therefore, everything that defines KevinAir and distinguishes KevinAir from everything else is not an attribute of the Creator, but, rather, is an attribute of the created character.  Even the millions (billions?) of ways in which you are different from, say, the consciousness of a planet are only  differences in Object A vs Object B, the puppets the Creator inhabits; without the Creator's consciousness, they are lifeless - just a set of ideas and attributes.  On the other hand, the Consciousness that perceives itself as KevinAir in the one case, and as a planet in the other, is the Creator itself.

So you see, the Creation and the Creator are inseparable.  Like all that is, they are One.  So the Creator did not create something outside himself that suffers, but, rather, seems to have wanted to explore suffering (among an infinity of other possible ideas) for him/her/itself.

I hope that clears this up for you.  Welcome to the forums, and accept nothing on faith.  Faith, as used by Ra and Quo, is the facility that allows you to consider the possibility that, despite the apparent chaos, separation, suffering and futility, all IS well - even if we cannot see it at the moment due to the fog in which the Veil clouds us; and faith in that sense is a different concept from blind belief. 

Free Will accounts for everything. It’s also the biggest stumbling block, I’ve noticed, with many people.

The fact that we have such radical free will is truly a gift. God doesn’t creat suffering. We do. We are allowed to experience the consequences of our actions to thereby learn from them. That’s a very loving thing that the Creator does. Sometimes this feels like a curse. I got myself into a pretty bad situation when I was doing drugs. I got physically addicted to them and suffered greatly. God did not do that, I did. It’s actually quite appropriate that the consequences of using drugs to feel good unnaturally results in the karma of feeling like total s***. Had I not experienced that great pain and suffering I might not have learned the lesson of not becoming attached to the material world and running away from my problems. I would not be where I am today had I not gone through everything I went through. That’s a great gift. God works in mysterious ways. Our Creator is infinitely loving, but he can also be stern when it’s needed. People don’t like that. They want life to be happy all the time, and it can be, but you must first get through the darkness within your own heart. Accept it, balanace it, love it, turn it to the Light. They don’t like to take responsibility for themselves and to accept the consequences of their actions, which may sometimes be severe.

We have to realize that there is both light and dark within our hearts.

The 32nd path on the Tree of Life is the path of Saturn, the path of sorrow, which connects Malkuth to Yesod. In other words, the experience is the Dark Night of the Soul. This is the first initiation that all spiritual seekers go through. It is the most difficult thing in life for you personally, at least that’s what ive come to learn. It is also your salvation, liberation.

In essence, yes we are the Creator. Q’uo would say that we are all very young Creators. In our worlds, we are co-Creators in that we create and shape our reality collectively. Most of the time people have no idea what they’re creating and the consequences that will manifest further down the line. This is how we learn. Ever wonder why history seemingly repeats itself? Humans aren’t learning the lesson and recreate again and again the cycle of empire. The Creator gives us free will, but we are responsible for what we choose to do with that free will, even when we don’t know what we are doing.

Right now we are quite limited in mind body and spirit. We are walking the path of evolution back to Source to harvest that experience so that the Creator may know Itself more and more. To become more than It is. When we have travelled through the densities we will return to Source and become once again the Creator in full. There is only one being here. There can be nothing but the Infinite One. What is reality behind Creation? Who is the Creator? This is Great Mystery.

Nau7ik, do you think that you are actually separate from the Creator right now? That you have somehow really split off from the Oneness in some fundamental way? Or can you consider the possibility that Oneness is the fundamental, fundamentally unalterable Truth of being - and, therefore, any separation is an illusion of separation? And yes, this illusion of separation does allow you to fully believe and act as if you were "a young Creator", but underneath it all - in the True Reality that you've temporarily been cut off from perceiving - you are, have ever been, and will ever be One with the All That Is, eternally whole and indivisible? That, therefore, you are THE Creator and can never possibly actually be anyone else, regardless of your perception otherwise?

What do you think?

I so agree Stranger, and I suppose this is what Nau7ik is feeling too ?
We need to meet duality in 3 D to have catalyst so we need to play the game we are separate from Creator. And not easy at times...

(09-03-2018, 08:18 PM)Foha Wrote: [ -> ]KevinAir, have you read Spinoza's The Ethics?

Perhaps it will lend some logic behind a lot of these assertions.

Thank you for making mention of this book. A quick search led to the following, of which I excerpted text.

Also there is this download: http://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/The-Ethics/

"To understand why Spinoza caused such outrage, read the following passage from his Preface to the Theological-Political Treatise: I have often wondered that men who make a boast of professing the Christian religion, which is a religion of love, joy, peace, temperance and honest dealing with all men, should quarrel so fiercely and display the bitterest hatred towards one another day by day . . .. I am quite certain that it stems from a widespread popular attitude of mind which looks on the ministries of the Church as dignities, its offices as posts of emolument and its pastors as eminent personages. For as soon as the Church’s true function began to be thus distorted, every worthless fellow felt an intense desire to enter holy orders . . .. Little wonder then, . . . that faith has become identical with credulity and biased dogma. But what dogma! Degrading rational man to beast, completely inhibiting man’s free judgment and his capacity to distinguish true from false, and apparently devised with the set purpose of utterly extinguishing the light of reason. Piety and religion . . . take the form of ridiculous mysteries, and men who utterly despise reason, who reject and turn away from the intellect as naturally corrupt – these are the men (and this is of all things the most iniquitous) who are believed to possess the divine light! (TPT Pref., CW 390–1) Spinoza’s criticism is breathtaking, even today. He accuses the Church of appointing self-aggrandising, anti-intellectual fools to positions of authority and of guiding people through lies and deceit. Religious dogma prevents people from using their reason, while faith is nothing more than superstition that inhibits enlightenment....."

"Enlightenment involves enabling people to make use of their own reason. But Spinoza recognises that increased rationality depends on a change in political and social conditions. A liberal democracy,freedom of expression and the rejection of superstition are necessary conditions for the free use of reason. Spinoza argues that the Bible is not the word of God revealing metaphysical truths, but a human text,subject to critical interpretation like any other work of literature. A miracle is not a divine intervention, but a natural event whose causes are unknown to us. Theology is therefore distinct from philosophy and the sciences, and total freedom of expression should be allowed in the latter. The civil state can flourish and fullfil its purpose – greater freedom – only if people are free to exercise their reason.The Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously, but Spinoza quickly became known as its author. The result was explosive: he was charged with atheism, sacrilege and denial of the soul,and was attacked by all sides of the religious and philosophical spectrum. Spinoza became known throughout Europe as the dangerous and subversive author of a book that was universally banned.This led to the widespread vilification of Spinoza’s thought, but also to underground currents of interest from free-thinkers all over Europe. ‘Spinozist’ became a term of derision and shorthand fora variety of anti-establishment positions; it was used as an insult and threat to anyone propounding ideas even slightly related to Spinoza’s. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the accusation of ‘Spinozism’ led philosophers to be dismissed from their posts and their books to be banned...."

"The Ethics is therefore not like philosophical texts written in prose. It is not a commentary on reality that explains the truth. Rather, it is an exercise in unfolding the truth through the active thinking of the reader.The Ethics is philosophy as activity and performance. As we read it,we are meant to be caught up in a certain movement of thought and to understand the truth through the activity that Spinoza draws us into. The reader is displaced from her usual position of externality to the text and made to be part of its workings. This is one reason why the Ethics is so difficult to read, but also why it is so intoxicating.The revelation of truth through the reader’s thinking activity reflects Spinoza’s belief (which we will discuss further in Part II) that a true idea is an activity of thought. A true idea is not a picture in the mind and it cannot adequately be expressed using representational means, such as language or pictures. That means that a text – any text – will be inadequate with respect to true ideas. A text can symbolically represent those true ideas, and the best texts will prompt us to actively think true ideas. Spinoza’s text, then, does not tell you the truth as a narrative. It aims to engage you in active thinking, to know the truth for yourself and thus to build your own rational understanding(Deleuze 1988: 83). This is best achieved through the geometrical method, which requires the reader to understand ideas as they follow logically from other ideas. For Spinoza, this logical order is the order of true understanding, as we shall see in Part I. As we perform each demonstration, our own thinking latches on to that order of true understanding. In the Ethics, you will encounter the following elements: ● Definitions which set out the meanings of key terms.● Axioms which set out basic, self-evident truths. (More will be said about definitions and axioms in Part I.) ● Propositions – the points that Spinoza argues for – and their demonstrations. ● Corollaries, which are propositions that follow directly from the propositions they are appended to. ● Lemma: propositions specifically related to physical bodies (these appear only in Part II). ● Postulates: assumptions about the human body that are drawn from (and apparently, justified by) common experience. ● Scholia: explanatory remarks on the propositions. In the scholia, Spinoza comments on his demonstrations, gives examples, raises and replies to objections and makes piquant observations about people’s beliefs and practices. The scholia are some of the most interesting and enjoyable passages of the Ethics.Before we begin, here are a few tips for reading the Ethics: ● It is important to read the book sequentially. Because the later propositions depend on earlier ones, this is not a book in which you can easily skip back and forth. ● If time allows, read the whole of the Ethics. If your university course treats only some sections of the text, read the whole Part in which those sections occur. ● Read slowly and carefully. Try to understand what Spinoza is trying to prove and to work through Spinoza’s demonstration. ● Sometimes it is helpful to read over a few propositions quickly, to get a gist of where Spinoza is going, before returning to read the demonstrations and scholia in detail. ● You may need to read some demonstrations multiple times (and even then, they may not make sense). ● You will encounter a lot of terms that are unfamiliar or that don’t mean what you think they mean. Don’t panic – this book is here to help.Make use of this Philosophical Guide to whatever extent you find helpful.It can be read concurrently with the Ethics or referred to afterwards. I clarify Spinoza’s meaning as I understand it, based on my extensive work with his text and commentaries on it. I offer relevant examples as often as possible. I have developed a series of figures which illustrate some of Spinoza’s most difficult points. My concern throughout has been with the experience of you, the reader, as you encounter the difficulties of the Ethics, and as you discover its fascination."

"Probably the most difficult challenge you will face in reading the Ethics is getting through Part I. You are presented with strange terminology, difficult metaphysical concepts and a series of arguments that don’t seem to be about anything real or concrete. These barriers can make reading this Part confusing, frustrating and boring. But with a little guidance, these initial sections will open up and become clearer.Once you have grasped the basic ideas Spinoza sets out, you will begin to understand his conception of reality, and that gives you the key to everything else in the book. The aim of this section is to help you to read this first Part and to clarify your own understanding – not only of Spinoza’s text, but of reality itself.One of the reasons for the difficulty of Part I is that it is concerned with ontology. Ontology is the theory of being: before we understand what things are, we need to understand what being is. What are we talking about when we say that things are? What is the source of the being of things?Even trying to think about these questions is difficult, let alone trying to answer them. You may wonder why it is important to answer these questions, given that our knowledge and experience is of concrete things, not of abstract being as such. Spinoza believes that we need to start with being because being is not a conceptual abstraction; it is the concrete ground of all of reality. Only once we understand what being is will we have the right basis for understanding objects, people, ideas and the universe.Spinoza’s basic idea is that being is one, that being is equivalent to God and that all the individual beings we experience are ‘modes’of being and thus ‘modes’ of God. This is what Spinoza tries to convince you of in Part I."

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/se...clnk&gl=us

Part I: God
Definitions
D1: In calling something ‘cause of itself’ I mean that its
essence involves existence, i.e. that its nature can’t be
conceived except as existing.
D2: A thing is said to be ‘finite in its own kind’ if it can be
limited by something else of the same nature. For example,
every body counts as ‘finite in its own kind’ because we can
always conceive another body that is even bigger. And a
thought can be limited by—·i.e. can count as finite because
of·—another thought ·that somehow exceeds it·. But a body
can’t be limited by a thought or a thought by a body.
D3: By ‘substance’ I understand: what is in itself and is
conceived through itself, i.e. that whose concept doesn’t
have to be formed out of the concept of something else.
D4: By ‘attribute’ I understand: what the intellect perceives
of a substance as constituting its essence.
D5: By ‘mode’ I understand: a state of a substance, i.e.
something that exists in and is conceived through something
else.
D6: By ‘God’ I understand: a thing that is absolutely infinite,
i.e. a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, each
of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. I say
‘absolutely infinite’ in contrast to ‘infinite in its own kind’.
If something is infinite only in its own kind, there can be
attributes that it doesn’t have; but if something is absolutely
infinite its essence ·or nature· contains every positive way
in which a thing can exist—·which means that it has all
possible attributes·.

D7: A thing is called ‘free’ if its own nature—with no input
from anything else—•makes it necessary for it to exist and
•causes it to act as it does. We say that a thing is ‘compelled’
if something other than itself makes it exist and causes it to
act in this or that specific way.
D8: By ‘eternity’ I understand: existence itself when conceived
to follow necessarily from the definition of the eternal
thing. A thing is eternal only if it is absolutely (logically)
necessary that the thing exists; for something to be eternal
it isn’t merely a matter of its existing at all times—it must
necessarily exist.

Propositions
1: A substance is prior in nature to its states.
This is evident from D3 and D5.
2: Two substances having different attributes have nothing
in common with one another.
This is also evident from D3. For each ·substance·
must be in itself and be conceived through itself,
which is to say that the concept of the one doesn’t
involve the concept of the other.
3: If things have nothing in common with one another,
one of them can’t be the cause of the other.
If they have nothing in common with one another,
then (by A5) they can’t be understood through one
another, and so (by A4) one can’t be the cause of the
other.
4: Two or more things are made distinct from one another
either by a difference in their attributes or by a
difference in their states.
Whatever exists is either •in itself or •in something else
(by A1), which is to say (by D3 and D5) that outside
the intellect there is nothing except •substances and
•their states. So there is nothing outside the intellect
through which things can be distinguished from one
another except •substances (which is to say (by D4)
their attributes) and •their states.
5: In Nature there cannot be two or more substances
having the same nature or attribute.
If there were two or more distinct substances, they
would have to be distinguished from one another by a
difference either •in their attributes or •in their states
(by 4). If they are distinguished only by a difference
in their attributes, then any given attribute can be
possessed by only one of them. Suppose, then, that
they are distinguished by a difference in their states.
But a substance is prior in nature to its states (by
1), so we can set the states aside and consider the
substance in itself; and then there is nothing left
through which one substance can be conceived as
distinguished from another, which by 4 amounts to
saying that we don’t have two or more substances
·with a single attribute·, but only one.
6: One substance can’t be produced by another substance.
In Nature there can’t be two substances that share
an attribute (by 5), that is (by 2), there can’t be two
substances that have something in common with each
other. Therefore (by 3) one substance can’t be the
cause of another, or be caused by it.
Corollary: A substance can’t be produced by anything else.
In Nature there are only substances and their states
(as is evident from A1, D3, and D5). But a substance
can’t be produced by a·nother· substance (by 6).
Therefore, a substance can’t be produced by anything
else at all.
This corollary is demonstrated even more easily from the
absurdity of its contradictory. If a substance could be
produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have
to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by A4). And so (by
D3) it wouldn’t be a substance.
7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.
A substance can’t be produced by anything else (by
the corollary to 6), so it must be its own cause; and
that, by D1, is to say that its essence necessarily
involves existence, i.e. it pertains to its nature to exist.
8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.
[The difficult demonstration of 8 has this at its core: if
x is finite then it is limited by something of the same
kind as itself, i.e. something that shares an attribute
with it; but no substance shares an attribute with any
other substance, so no substance can be limited in
this way, so every substance is infinite.]
First note on 7 and 8: Since finiteness is partly negative,
while being infinite is an unqualifiedly ·positive· affirmation
of the existence of some nature, it follows from 7 alone that
every substance must be infinite; for in calling a substance
‘finite’ we partly, because of the negative element in finiteness,
deny existence to its nature, and according to 7 that is
absurd.
Second note on 7 and 8: I’m sure that the proof of 7 will be
found difficult to grasp by people who judge things confusedly
and haven’t been accustomed to understanding things
through their first causes. Such people don’t distinguish
the qualities of substances from the substances themselves,
and they don’t know how things are produced. This brings it
about that they fictitiously ascribe to •substances the ·sort
of· beginning that they see •natural things to have; for those
who don’t know the true causes of things confuse everything,
and have no difficulty supposing that both trees and men
speak, that men are formed both from stones and from seed,
and that anything can be changed into anything else! So,
also, those who confuse the divine nature with human nature
easily ascribe human character-traits to God, particularly
must be an external cause of its existing. Now since it
pertains to the nature of a substance to exist (already shown
in this note), its definition must involve necessary existence,
and so its existence must be inferred from its definition alone.
But, as we have shown in 2 and 3, the existence of a number
of substances can’t follow from a definition. So it follows that
there can exist only one substance having a given nature.
9: The more reality or being each thing has, the more
attributes belong to it.
This is evident from D4.
10: Each attribute of a substance must be conceived
through itself.
An attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning
a substance, as constituting its essence (by D4); so
(by D3) it must be conceived through itself.
Note on 10: From these propositions it is evident that
although two attributes can be conceived to be really distinct
(each conceived without the aid of the other), we still can’t
infer from that that they constitute—·that is, constitute
the natures of, i.e. are possessed by·—two different substances.
. . . It is far from absurd to ascribe many attributes
to one substance. Indeed, nothing in Nature is clearer
than that each thing must be conceived under some attribute,
and the more reality a thing has the more attributes
it has—attributes that express necessity, or eternity and
infinity. So it is utterly clear that an absolutely infinite
thing must be defined (as in D6) as a thing that consists of
infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal
and infinite essence. If you want to know how we can tell
when there are many substances, read on: in the following
propositions I shall show that in Nature there exists only one
substance, which is absolutely infinite. So there is nothing
to ‘tell’.
11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes
each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence,
necessarily exists.
If God didn’t exist, then (by A7) God’s essence would
not involve existence; and (by 7) that is absurd. Therefore
God necessarily exists.
A second proof: For each thing there must be assigned
a cause or reason for its existence (if it exists) and for its
nonexistence (if it doesn’t). . . . This reason or cause must be
either contained in, or lie outside of, the nature of the thing.
For example, the very nature of a square circle indicates the
reason why it doesn’t exist, namely because it involves a
contradiction; and the very nature of a substance explains
why it does exist, because that nature involves existence (see
7). But the reason why [changing Spinoza’s example] a coin exists,
or why it doesn’t exist, does not follow from its nature but
from the order of the whole of the physical world. For from
this ·order· it must follow either that the coin necessarily
exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.
These things are self-evident. From them it follows that
a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause that
prevents it from existing. So if there is no reason or cause
that prevents God from existing or takes God’s existence
away, it certainly follows that God necessarily exists.
But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to
be either •in God’s very nature or •outside it and in another
substance of a different nature. It couldn’t be in a substance
of the same nature as God’s, for the supposition that there is
such a substance is, itself, the supposition that God exists.
So it would have to be a substance of a nature different from
God’s; but such a substance would have nothing in common
with God (by 2) and so could neither give existence to God
nor take it away. So a reason or cause that takes away God’s
existence couldn’t lie outside the divine nature.
It would, then, have to be in God’s nature itself. That
would mean that God’s nature involved a contradiction, ·like
the square circle·. But it is absurd to affirm this of a thing
that is absolutely infinite and supremely perfect. (·That is
because •a contradiction must involve something of the form
‘P and not-P—a ‘square circle’ would be something that was
‘square and not square’ because ‘not square is contained
in the meaning of ‘circle’—and •a thing that is infinite and
perfect is one whose nature involves nothing negative, so
nothing of the contradictory form·.) So there is no cause
or reason—either in God or outside God—that takes God’s
existence away. Therefore God necessarily exists.
A third proof: [slightly expanded from Spinoza’s very compact
statement of it] To be unable to exist is to lack power, and
conversely to be able to exist is to have power (this is
self-evident). Now, suppose that God doesn’t exist but some
finite things do exist necessarily. In that case, these finite
things are more powerful than an absolutely infinite thing
(because they can exist and the absolutely infinite thing
can’t). But this is self-evidently absurd. So either nothing
exists or an absolutely infinite thing also exists. But we
exist, either in ourselves as substances that necessarily exist
or as qualities of something else that necessarily exists (see
A1 and 7). Therefore an absolutely infinite thing—that is (by
D6) God—necessarily exists.
Note on the third proof of 11: In this last demonstration
I wanted to show God’s existence a posteriori (·bringing in
the contingent fact that we exist·), so as to make the demonstration
easier to grasp—but not because God’s existence
doesn’t follow a priori from the same premises. For since
being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality
belongs to the nature of a thing the more powers it has, of
itself, to exist. Therefore an absolutely infinite thing (God)
has of itself an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that
reason, God exists absolutely. Still, there may be many who
won’t easily see the force of this proof because they have
been accustomed to think only about things that flow from
external causes. And of those things they see that •the ones
that quickly and easily come into existence also easily perish.
And conversely, they judge that •complicated and intricately
structured things are harder to produce, i.e. that they don’t
exist so easily. I might free them from these prejudices
by looking into •what truth there is in the proposition that
what quickly comes to be quickly perishes, and considering
whether •all things are equally easy in respect to the whole
of Nature (·I think they are·). But I shan’t go into any of that.
All I need here is to point out that I am here speaking not
of things that come into existence from external causes but
only of substances, which (by 6) can’t be produced by any
external cause. For things that come to exist from external
causes—whether they have many parts or few—owe all their
perfection or reality to the power of the external cause; and
therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of
their external cause and not from their own perfection. On
the other hand, whatever perfection a substance has is not
due to any external cause; so its existence must follow from
its nature alone; so its existence is nothing but its essence.
So perfection doesn’t take away the existence of a thing, but
on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away. So
there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain
than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite thing, i.e.
a perfect thing, i.e. God. For since God’s essence •excludes
all imperfection and •involves absolute perfection, by that
very fact it removes every cause of doubting God’s existence
and gives the greatest certainty concerning it. I think this
will be clear to you even if you are only moderately attentive!
12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived
from which it follows that the substance can be divided.
Suppose that a substance can be conceived as being
divisible; then either its parts will also have the nature
of the substance or they won’t. If they •do, then (by
8) each part will be infinite, and (by 7) will be its own
cause; and (by 5) each part will have to consist of a
different attribute. And so many substances can be
formed from one, which is absurd (by 6). Furthermore,
the parts would have nothing in common with their
whole (by 2), and the whole (by D4 and 10) could
exist without its parts and be conceived without them;
and no-one can doubt that that is absurd. But if on
the other hand the parts •do not retain the nature
of substance, then dividing the whole substance into
equal parts would deprive it of the nature of substance,
meaning that it would cease to exist; and (by 7) that
is absurd.
13: A substance that is absolutely infinite is indivisible.
If it were divisible, its parts would either retain the
nature of an absolutely infinite substance or they
wouldn’t. If they did, then there would be a number
of substances of the same nature, which (by 5) is
absurd. If they didn’t, then (as in 12) an absolutely
infinite substance could ·be divided into such parts
and thereby· cease to exist, which (by 11) is also
absurd.
Corollary: No substance is divisible, and thus no corporeal
substance, insofar as it is a substance, is divisible. [This use
of ‘insofar as’ is explained on page 9 just above the start of section V.]
Note on 12–13: That substance is indivisible can be understood
more simply merely from this: the nature of substance
can’t be conceived other than as infinite, whereas ‘a part of
a substance’ can only mean a finite substance, which (by 8)
implies a plain contradiction.
14: God is the only substance that can exist or be
conceived.
Since God is an absolutely infinite thing, of whom no
attribute expressing an essence of substance can be
denied (by 6), and God necessarily exists (by 11), if
there were a substance other than God it would have
to be explained through some attribute of God; ·but
explanations can flow only within attributes, not from
one attribute to another·; and so two substances with
an attribute in common would exist, which (by 5) is
absurd. So no substance other than God can exist;
and none such can be conceived either, for if it could
be conceived it would have to be conceived as existing,
and the first part of this demonstration shows that to
be absurd. Therefore, God is the only substance that
can exist or be conceived.
First corollary: God is unique, i.e. (by 6) in Nature there is
only one substance, and it is absolutely infinite.
Second corollary: An extended thing and a thinking thing
are either attributes of God or (by A1) states of God’s attributes.
15: Whatever exists is in God, and nothing can exist or
be conceived without God.
14 secures that apart from God there cannot exist (or
be conceived) any substance, i.e. (by D3) any thing
that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But
(by D5) modes can’t exist or be conceived without a
substance ·that they are modes of ·. So modes can
exist only in the divine nature, and can be conceived
only through that nature. But (by A1) substances and
modes are all there is. Therefore, everything is in God
and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
Note on 15: [This text follows Curley in numbering sections of this
note, and of the note on 17 and the Appendix, as an aid to reference.]
I. Some people imagine a God who is like a man, consisting
of a body and a mind, and subject to passions. But
how far they wander from the true knowledge of God is
shown well enough by what I have already demonstrated,
and I shan’t talk about them any more. Everyone who has
to any extent contemplated the divine nature denies that
God is corporeal. This is best proved from the fact that by
‘a body’ we understand a quantity that has length, breadth,
and depth, • by some specific shape. Nothing could be more
absurd than to say this about God, i.e. about a thing that is
infinite [= •’unlimited’.]
In trying to demonstrate this same conclusion by different
arguments from mine, some people clearly show that ·as
well as denying that God is or has •a body· they conclude
that the divine nature doesn’t in any way involve corporeal
or •extended substance. They maintain that the corporeal
world, ·rather than being part of God’s nature·, has been
created by God. But by what divine power could it be
created? They have no answer to that, which shows clearly
that they don’t understand what they are saying.
At any rate, I have demonstrated clearly enough—in my
judgment, at least—that no substance can be produced or
created by any other (see the corollary to 6 and the second
note on 8). Next, I have shown (14) that God is the only
substance that can exist or be conceived, and from this I
have inferred in the second corollary to 14 that extended
substance is one of God’s infinite attributes. To explain
all this more fully, I shall refute my opponents’ arguments,
which all come down to these two.
II. First, they think that corporeal substance, insofar
as it is substance, consists of parts. From this they infer
that it cannot be infinite, and thus cannot pertain to God.
They explain this through many examples, of which I shall
mention three.
•If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let us conceive
it to be divided into two parts. If each part is finite, then an
infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If
each part is infinite, then there is one infinite twice as large
as another, which is also absurd. •Again, if an infinite quantity
is measured by parts each equal to a foot, it will consist
of infinitely many of them, as it will also if it is measured by
parts each equal to an inch. So one infinite number will be
twelve times as great as another, which is no less absurd.
•Finally, suppose that from one point in something of infinite
extent two lines are extended to infinity. Although near
the beginning they are a certain determinate distance apart,
the distance between them is continuously increased ·as
they lengthen·, until finally it stops being determinate and
becomes indeterminable; ·which is also absurd·. Since these
absurdities follow—so they think—from the supposition of an
infinite quantity, they infer that corporeal substance must
be finite and consequently cannot pertain to God’s essence.
III. Their second argument is also drawn from God’s
supreme perfection. For, they say, God as a supremely
perfect thing cannot be acted on. But corporeal substance,
since it is divisible, can be acted on; ·anything that is
divisible can be pulled apart by outside forces·. So it follows
that corporeal substance does not pertain to God’s essence.
IV. These are the arguments that I find being used by
authors who want to show that corporeal substance is
unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot have anything to
do with it. But anyone who is properly attentive will find that
I have already replied to them, since these arguments are
based wholly on the supposition that corporeal substance is
composed of parts, which I have already (12 and corollary to
13) shown to be absurd. Anyone who wants to consider the
matter rightly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed
that’s what they are) from which they infer that extended
substance is finite don’t at all follow from •the supposition
of an infinite quantity, but from •supposing that an infinite
quantity might be measurable and composed of finite parts.
All they are entitled to infer from the absurdities they have
uncovered is that infinite quantity is not measurable and is
not composed of finite parts. This is just what I have already
demonstrated above (12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at
me turns against themselves. . . .
Others, imagining that a line is composed of points, know
how to invent many arguments showing that a line can’t be
divided to infinity. And indeed it is just as absurd to say that
corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, as it is
to say that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of
lines, and the lines of points.
This must be admitted by all those who know that clear
reason is infallible, and especially those who deny that there
is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided
into parts that were really distinct, why couldn’t one part be
annihilated while the rest remained inter-related as before
(·thus creating a vacuum·)? Why must they all be so fitted
together that there is no vacuum? If two things are really
distinct from one another ·rather than being different modes
or aspects of a single substance·, one of them can stay
where it is whatever the other does. But there isn’t any
vacuum in Nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere, ·namely
in my Descartes’s Principles, part 2, propositions 2 and
3·); all the parts of Nature do have to hang together so
that there is no vacuum; so it follows that those parts are
not really distinct from one another, ·i.e. that they are not
distinct things·, which is to say that corporeal substance,
insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided

Spinoza means that it isn’t subject to divisions that go all the way down, so to
speak—divisions that really split it up into separate things. He does
allow that corporeal substance—i.e. the entire material world—can be
divided into (for example) wet bits and dry bits, soft bits and hard bits;
but none of these bits is an independent and self-sufficient thing. Its
existence consists merely in the fact that the extended world—which is
God considered under the attribute of extension—has a certain property
at a certain location.]
V. Why are we by nature so inclined to divide quantity?
The answer involves the fact that we have two ways of
thinking about quantity: we can think of it •abstractly or
superficially, which is how we depict it to ourselves in our
imagination; and we can also think of it •as substance,
which is done by the intellect alone without help from
the imagination. If we attend to quantity as it is in the
imagination—which we often do, finding it easy—it will be
found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we
attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar
as it is a substance—which we don’t do often, finding it
hard—then (as I have already sufficiently demonstrated) it
will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible.
This will be clear enough to anyone who knows how to
distinguish the intellect from the imagination—particularly
if he bears in mind that matter is everywhere the same,
and that parts are distinguished in it only through our
conceiving it to have different qualities, so that its parts
are distinguished only modally but not really. [That is: its
parts have different qualities or modes, but are not genuinely and deeply
distinct things. ‘Really’ (Latin realiter) comes from the Latin res, meaning
‘thing’.]
For example, we conceive that water is divided and its
parts separated from one another—considered as water, but
not considered as corporeal substance, for considered as
substance it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water
considered as water can come into existence and go out of
existence, but considered as substance it can do neither.
·When water considered as water goes out of existence, what
happens at the level of substance is, roughly speaking, that
an area in the one extended substance changes from being
wet to being dry·.
VI. I think this also answers the second argument—·the
one in III above·—because that is based on the supposition
that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible and made
up of parts. Even if this reply were not sufficient, ·the
argument would not succeed, because· there is no reason
why divisibility should be unworthy of the divine nature. For
(by 14) apart from God there can be no substance by which
the divine nature would be acted on, ·and so God’s being
made up of parts would not bring with it a vulnerability to a
dismantling attack from the outside, so to speak·. All things,
I repeat, are in God, and whatever happens does so through
the laws of God’s infinite nature and follows (as I’ll show)
from the necessity of God’s essence. So it can’t be said in any
way that God is acted on by something else, or that extension
is unworthy of the divine nature—even if it is supposed to
be divisible—provided that God is granted to be eternal and
infinite.
[In 16 and its appendages, ‘unlimited’ translates a word that often means
‘infinite’.]
16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must
follow infinitely many things in infinitely many ways i.e.
everything that can fall under an unlimited intellect.
This proposition must be plain to anyone who attends
to the fact that the intellect infers from a thing’s
definition a number of properties that really do follow
necessarily from it (i.e. from the very essence of the
thing); and that •the more reality the definition of
the thing expresses, i.e. •the more reality the essence
of the defined thing involves, •the more properties
the intellect infers. But the divine nature has absolutely
infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also
expresses an essence that is infinite in its own kind,
and so from its necessity there must follow infinitely
many things in infinite ways (i.e. everything that can
fall under an unlimited intellect).
First corollary to 16: God is the efficient cause of all things
that can fall under an unlimited intellect. [An ‘efficient cause’ is
just what we today call a cause. It used to be contrasted to ‘final cause’:
to assign an event a final cause was to explain it in terms of its purpose,
what it occurred for. See pages 18–19 below.]
Second corollary to 16: God is a cause through himself/
itself and not an accidental cause.
Third corollary to 16: God is the absolutely first cause.
17: God acts from the laws of the divine nature alone,
and is not compelled by anything.
I have just shown (16) that from •the necessity of the
divine nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from
•the laws of God’s nature alone, absolutely infinite
things follow; and in 15 I have demonstrated that
nothing can be or be conceived without God—that all
things are in God. So there can’t be anything outside
God by which God could be caused or compelled to
act. Therefore, God acts from the laws of the divine
nature alone, and is not compelled by anything.
First corollary to 17: There is no cause, either extrinsically
or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the
perfection of the divine nature.
Second corollary to 17: God alone is a free cause.
God alone exists only from the necessity of the divine
nature (by 11 and first corollary to 14), and acts from
the necessity of the divine nature (by 17). Therefore
(by D7) God alone is a free cause.
Note on 17: I. Some people think, regarding the things that
I have said follow from God’s nature (i.e. are in God’s power),
that God could bring it about that they don’t happen, are not
produced by God; from which they infer that God is a free
cause. But this is tantamount to saying that God can bring
it about that the nature of a triangle doesn’t require that its
three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a
given cause the effect would not follow—which is absurd.
Further, I shall show later, without help from 17, that
God’s nature doesn’t involve either intellect or will. I know of
course that many think they can demonstrate that a supreme
intellect and a free will pertain to God’s nature; for, they say,
they know nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than
what is the highest perfection in us.
Moreover, while thinking of God as actually
•understanding things in the highest degree, they don’t
believe that God can bring it about that all those understood
things •exist. For they think that would destroy God’s power.
If God had created all the things in the divine intellect (they
say), then God couldn’t have created anything more, which
they believe to be incompatible with God’s omnipotence. So
these thinkers prefer to maintain that God has no leanings
in any direction, not creating anything except what God has
decreed to create by some fundamental free choice.
But I think I have shown clearly enough (see 16) that from
God’s supreme power or infinite nature infinitely many things
in infinitely many ways—that is, all ·possible· things—have
necessarily flowed or do always follow, with the same necessity
and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle
it follows from eternity that its three angles equal two right
angles. So God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity
and will remain actual to eternity. I think that this maintains
God’s omnipotence better ·than does the view that there are
things God could do but chooses not to·.
Indeed—to be frank about it—my opponents seem to deny
God’s omnipotence. For they have to admit that God understands
infinitely many creatable things which nevertheless
God will never be able to create. For creating everything that
God understands to be creatable would (according to them)
exhaust God’s omnipotence and render God imperfect. To
maintain that God is perfect, therefore, they are driven to
maintaining that God cannot bring about everything that
lies within the scope of the divine power. I don’t see how
anything more absurd than this, or more contrary to God’s
omnipotence, could be dreamed up!
II. I shall add a point about the intellect and will that
are commonly attributed to God. If ‘will’ and ‘intellect’ do
pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must understand by
each of these something different from what men commonly
understand by them. For the ‘intellect’ and ‘will’ that would
constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from
our intellect and will, not agreeing with them in anything
but the name. They wouldn’t match one another any more
than Sirius the ‘dog-star’ matches the dog that is a barking
animal. I shall demonstrate this.
We have intellect, and what we understand through it
is either •earlier than the act of understanding (as most
people think) or •simultaneous with it; but if the divine
nature includes intellect, it can’t be like ours in this respect,
because God is •prior in causality to all things (by the first
corollary to 16). ·So far from its being the case that God’s
intellect represents something because the thing exists·,
the fundamental nature of things is what it is because
God’s intellect represents it in that way. So God’s intellect,
conceived as constituting the divine essence, is really the
cause of the essence and of the existence of things. Some
writers seem to have realized this—the ones who have said
that God’s •intellect, •will and •power are one and the same.
Therefore, since God’s intellect is the only cause of
things—of their essence as well as of their existence—God
must differ from other things both in essence and in existence.
·I shall explain this·. Something that is caused
differs from its cause precisely in what it gets from the cause.
For example, a man may be the cause of the existence of
another man, but not of his essence—·that is, not of the
human nature that he has, not of the-possibility-of-beinghuman
·—for the latter is an eternal truth. So they can
agree entirely in their essence, ·having the very same human
nature·. But they must differ in their existences: if one
of the men goes out of existence, that need not destroy
the other’s existence. But if the essence of one could be
destroyed and become false—·that is, if it could become the
case that there was no such thing as human nature, no
possibility-of-being-human·—then the essence of the other
would also be destroyed.
So if something causes both the essence and the existence
of some effect, it must differ in essence and existence from
the effect. But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence
and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore God’s intellect,
conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our
intellect both in essence and in existence and can’t agree
with it in anything but in name—which is what I said. It is
easy to see that there is a similar proof regarding God’s will
and our will.
18: God is the in-dwelling and not the going-across
cause of all things.
In-dwelling because: everything that exists is in God
and must be conceived through God (by 15), and so
(by the first corollary to 16) God is the cause of all
things that are in God. Not going-across because:
by 14 there can’t be anything outside God ·for God
to act on·. So God is the in-dwelling and not the
going-across cause of all things.
[The expressions ‘in-dwelling- and ‘going-across’ render technical terms
of Spinoza’s that are usually translated by ‘immanent’ and ‘transeunt’
respectively. The distinction itself is plain: I am the in-dwelling cause of
my hand’s moving when I move it, and the going-across cause of the fall
of the tumbler that I knock off the table.]
19: God is eternal, and all God’s attributes are eternal.
God (by D6) is a substance which (by 11) necessarily
exists, that is (by 7) to whose nature it pertains to
exist. . . and therefore (by D8) God is eternal.
Next point: God’s •attributes are to be understood
(by D4) as •what expresses an essence of the Divine
substance. So the attributes partake of the nature of
substance, and I have already shown (7) that eternity
pertains to the nature of substance. Therefore each of
the attributes must involve eternity, and so they are
all eternal.
Note on 19: This proposition is also utterly clear from
my way of demonstrating God’s existence (11), for that
demonstration established that God’s existence is an eternal
truth just as God’s essence is. I have also demonstrated
God’s eternity in another way in my Descartes’s Principles,
Part I, proposition 19, and there is no need to repeat that
here.
20: God’s existence and God’s essence are one and the
same.
God is eternal and so are all of God’s attributes ((by
19), that is (by D8) each of God’s attributes expresses
existence. Therefore, the attributes of God that (by
D4) explain God’s eternal essence at the same time
explain God’s eternal existence, which is to say that
what constitutes God’s essence also constitutes God’s
existence. So God’s existence and God’s essence are
one and the same.
First corollary to 20: God’s existence, like God’s essence,
is an eternal truth.
Second corollary to 20: God is unchangeable, or all of
God’s attributes are unchangeable.
If they changed as to their existence, they would also
(by 20) change as to their essence,. . . which is absurd.
21: All the things that follow from the absolute nature
of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and
be infinite, and are through the same attribute eternal
and infinite.
[The lengthy and extremely difficult demonstration
of this is constructed in the form ‘Suppose this is
false. . . ’ and then trying to deduce an absurdity from
the supposition. For the first part of the proposition
it takes an example of what the ‘something that is
finite and has a limited existence or duration’ might
be supposed to be, and makes the first part of the
proposition stand or fall with that example. For the
second part of the proposition, it again lets everything
rest on an example, indeed the same example, of
something that might be supposed not to be eternal
and infinite. The demonstration also gives trouble by
allowing heavy overlap between the first and second
parts of the proposition.]

22: Anything that follows from some attribute of God
when it is modified ·or enriched or added to· by a quality
which that same attribute causes to exist necessarily
and to be infinite must itself also exist necessarily and
be infinite.
The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the
same way as the demonstration of 21. [21 concerns
the likes of: what follows from God’s being extended.
22 concerns the likes of: what follows from God’s involving
motion and rest; this is not extension as such,
extension considered ‘absolutely’, but it necessarily
follows from extension.]
23: Every mode that exists necessarily and is infinite
must have followed either from •the absolute nature of
some attribute of God—·that is, some attribute taken all
by itself·—or from •some attribute that is modified, ·i.e.
enriched or added to·, by a quality that exists necessarily
and is infinite.
A mode is in something other than itself, through
which it must be conceived (by D5), that is (by 15) it is
in God alone and can be conceived only through God.
So if a mode is thought of as existing necessarily and
being infinite, it must be inferred from or perceived
through some attribute of God that is conceived to
express infinity and necessity of existence. It may
follow from •the absolute nature of the attribute—·the
unadorned attribute, so to speak·—or from •the attribute
modified or enriched or added to by some mediating
quality which itself follows from the attribute’s
absolute nature and is therefore (by 22) necessarily
existent and infinite 24: The essence of things produced by God does not
involve existence.
This is evident from D1. For if something’s nature
involves existence, is its own cause, existing only from
the necessity of its own nature, ·and so cannot be
caused by God·.
Corollary to 24: God is the cause not only of things’ beginning
to exist, but also of their continuing to exist.
If we attend to the essence of any caused thing—
not considering whether the thing actually exists or
not—we shall find that this essence involves neither
existence nor duration. So such an essence can’t be
the cause either of the thing’s coming into existence
or of its staying in existence; and the only cause of
both is God (by the first corollary to 14).
25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things but also of their essence.
Suppose this is wrong. Then God is not the cause
of the essence of things, and so (by A4) the essence
of things can be conceived without God. But (by 15)
this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the
essence of things.
Note on 25: This proposition follows more clearly from 16,
which implies that from the given divine nature both the
essence of things and their existence must necessarily be
inferred; and, in brief, God must be called the cause of
all things in the same sense in which God is said to be
self -caused. This will be established still more clearly from
the following corollary.
Corollary to 25: Particular things are nothing but states of
God’s attributes, or modes by which [= ‘ways in which’] God’s
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.
The demonstration is evident from 15 and D5.
26: A thing that has been caused to produce an effect
has necessarily been caused in this way by God; and one
that has not been caused by God cannot cause itself to
produce an effect.
[The demonstration of this is omitted.]
27: A thing that has been caused by God to produce an
effect cannot make itself be uncaused.
This proposition is evident from A3.
28: A particular thing (that is, a thing that is finite
and has a limited existence) can’t exist or be caused
to produce an effect unless it is caused to exist and
produce an effect by another cause that is also finite
and has a limited existence; and the latter can’t exist
or be caused to produce an effect unless it is caused to
exist and produce an effect by yet another. . . and so on,
to infinity.
[Somewhat simplified version of the demonstration:] Anything
that follows necessarily from something infinite and
eternal must itself be infinite and eternal; so something
that is finite and has a limited existence—that
is, a finite item that comes into existence, lasts for
a while, and then goes out of existence—can’t be an
upshot or effect of something infinite and eternal. So
its source must be of the other sort, that is, must be
finite and non-eternal. And that line of thought reapplies
to the latter item, and then to its source, and
so on ad infinitum. Each finite and temporally limited
item is to be thought of not as •something entirely
other than God, but rather as •God-considered-ashaving-
such-and-such-attributes-and-modes.
Note on 28: Certain things had to be produced by God
immediately, namely those that follow necessarily from God’s
nature alone, and others. . . had to be produced through the
mediation of these first things. From this it follows:
I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things
produced immediately by God, and not ·a proximate cause·
in God’s own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither
be nor be conceived without their cause (by 15 and 24C).
II. That God cannot properly be called the ‘remote’ cause
of singular things (except perhaps to distinguish them from
things that God has produced immediately, i.e. that follow
from God’s absolute nature). A ‘remote’ cause is one that
isn’t conjoined in any way with its effect; but every existing
thing is in God, and depends on God in such a way that it
can’t exist or be conceived without God.
29: In Nature there is nothing contingent; all things
have been caused by the necessity of the divine nature
to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
Whatever exists is in God (by 15); and (by 11) God
exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes
of the divine nature—·the ways in which God exists·—
have also followed from that nature necessarily (by
16)—either •following from the divine nature just in
itself (by 21) or •following from it considered as caused
to act in a certain way (by 28). Further, God is the
cause not only of the existence of these modes (by
corollary to 24) but also of their having such-and-such
causal powers. For if they hadn’t been caused by
God, then (by 26) they could not possibly have caused
themselves. And conversely (by 27) if they have been
caused by God, it is impossible that they should
render themselves uncaused. So all things have been
caused from the necessity of the divine nature not only
to exist but to exist in a certain way, and to produce
effects in a certain way; and all of this is necessary,
not contingent. There is nothing contingent.

At this point Spinoza inserts a note explaining in terms of
his philosophy a pair of mediaeval technical terms, the Latin
of which can be translated as ‘naturing Nature’ (Nature as a
cause) and ‘natured Nature’ (Nature as an effect) respectively.
The distinction has attracted much attention from scholars,
but in itself it is fairly trivial, and it has no structural role in
the Ethics. Spinoza uses the terms only in 31, to which he
makes no further reference anywhere in the work. The note
and that proposition are omitted from the present version,
and along with them 30, which has almost no role except in
31.]
32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary one.
The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode ·or
way· of thinking. And so (by 28) each volition—·each
act of the will·—can exist and be fit to produce an
effect only if it is caused by another cause, and this
cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. So the
will requires a cause by which it is caused to exist and
produce an effect; and so (by D7) it cannot be called a
‘free’ cause but only a necessary or compelled one.
That was based on the will’s being a finite entity to
which 28 applies. Suppose it is infinite, making 28
irrelevant to it. Then it falls under 23, which means
that it has to be caused to exist and produce an
effect by God—this time by God-as-having-the-infiniteand-
eternal-essence-of-thought rather than God-ashaving-
this-or-that-temporary-and-local-quality. So
on this supposition also the will is not a free cause
but a compelled one.
Corollary to 32: God doesn’t produce any effect through
freedom of the will.
Second corollary to 32: Will and intellect are related to
God’s nature as motion and rest are, and as are absolutely
all natural things, which (by 29) must be caused by God to
exist and produce an effect in a certain way.
The will, like everything else, requires a cause by
which it is caused to exist and produce an effect in a
certain way. And although from a given will or intellect
infinitely many things may follow, God still can’t be
said on that account to act from freedom of the will,
any more than God can be said to act from ‘freedom
of motion and rest’ on account of the things that
follow from motion and rest! So will doesn’t pertain to
God’s nature any more than do other natural things;
it is related to God in the same way as motion and
rest. . . ·In short: acts of the will, such as human
choices and decisions, are natural events with natural
causes, just as are (for example) collisions of billiard
balls. And to attribute will to God, saying that because
the cause of each volition is God (= Nature) therefore
God has choices and makes decisions, is as absurd as
to suppose that God is rattling around on the billiard
table·.
33: Things could not have been produced by God in any
way or in any order other than that in which they have
been produced.
All things have necessarily followed from God’s given
nature (by 16), and have been caused from the necessity
of God’s nature to exist and produce an effect in a
certain way (by 29). To think of them as possibly being
different in some way is, therefore, to think of God as
possibly being different; that is to think that there is
some other nature that God could have—some other
divine nature—and if such a nature is possible then
it is actually instantiated, which means that there
are two Gods. But it is absurd to suppose that there
could have been two Gods. So things could not have
been produced in any other way or in any other order
than they have been produced.
Note on 33: Since by these propositions I have made it as
clear as day that there is absolutely nothing in things on the
basis of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to
explain briefly what we should understand by ‘contingent’—
but first, what we should understand by ‘necessary’ and
‘impossible’. A thing is called ‘necessary’ either •by reason of
its essence or •by reason of its cause. For a thing’s existence
follows necessarily either from its essence and definition
or from a given efficient cause. And a thing is also called
‘impossible’ for these same reasons—namely, either because
its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because
no external cause has been caused to produce such a thing
·in which case the external causes that do exist will have
been enough to prevent the thing from existing·.
A thing is called ‘contingent’ only because of a lack of
our knowledge. If we don’t know that the thing’s essence
involves a contradiction, or if we know quite well that its
essence doesn’t involve a contradiction, but we can’t say
anything for sure about its existence because the order of
causes is hidden from us, it can’t seem to us either necessary
or impossible. So we call it ‘contingent’ or ‘·merely· possible’.
Second note on 33: From this it clearly follows that things
have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since
they have followed necessarily from a most perfect nature.
God’s producing everything there is doesn’t mean that God
is in any way imperfect. The suggestion that God could have
acted differently is, as I have shown, absurd. . . .
I’m sure that many people will reject my view as absurd,
without even being willing to examine it. Of course they
will! because they have been accustomed to credit God
with having an absolute will—·that is, with just non-causally
deciding what to do·—which attributes to God a ‘freedom’
quite different from what I have taught (D7). But I am also
sure that if they would consent to reflect on the matter, and
pay proper attention to my chain of our demonstrations,
they would end up utterly rejecting the ‘freedom’ they now
attribute to God, not only as futile but as a great obstacle to
science. I needn’t repeat here what I said in the note on 17.
Still, to please them ·or at least meet them half-way·, I
shall argue on the basis that God’s essence does involve will,
and shall still prove that it follows from God’s perfection that
things could not have been created by God in any other way
or any other order. It will be easy to show this if we consider
·two things·. First, as my opponents concede, it depends on
God’s decree and will alone that each thing is what it is; for
otherwise God wouldn’t be the cause of all things. Secondly,
all God’s decrees have been established by God from eternity;
for otherwise God would be convicted of imperfection and
inconstancy. But since in eternity there is neither when,
nor before, nor after, it follows purely from God’s perfection
that God could never have decreed anything different. It is a
mistake to think of God as having existed for a while without
making any decrees and then making some.
The opponents will say that in supposing God to have
made another nature of things, or supposing that from eternity
God had decreed something else concerning Nature and
its order, one is not implicitly supposing any imperfection in
God.
Still, if they say this, they will ·have to· concede also
that God’s decrees can be changed by their maker. Their
supposition that God could have decreed Nature and its
order to be different from how they actually are involves
supposing that God could have had a different intellect
and will from those that God actually has; and they—·the
opponents·—hold that this could have been the case without
any change of God’s essence or of God’s perfection. But
if that is right, why can’t God now change God’s decrees
concerning created things while remaining just as perfect?
·It is absurd to suppose that God can do this—e.g. that from
now on the laws of physics will be slightly different every
second Tuesday—but my opponents have left themselves
with no basis for ruling this out as the absurdity that it
really is·. . . .
Therefore, since things could not have been produced
by God in any other way or any other order, and since the
truth of this follows from God’s supreme perfection, we have
to accept that God willed to create all the things that are
in God’s intellect, with the same perfection with which God
understands them.
The opponents will say that there is no perfection or
imperfection in things: what is to count in things as making
them perfect or imperfect, and thus called ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
depends only on God’s will. So God could have brought it
about, simply by willing it, that what is now perfection would
have been the greatest imperfection, and conversely that
what is now an imperfection in things would have been the
most perfect. ·Thus the opponents·. But God necessarily
understands what God wills; so what the opponents say here
is tantamount to saying outright that God could bring it
about through an act of will that God understands things in
a different way from how God does understand them. And
this, as I have just shown, is a great absurdity. . . .
I confess that •this opinion that subjects all things to a
certain unguided will of God and makes everything depend
on God’s whim is nearer the truth than •the view of those
who maintain that God does all things for the sake of the
good. For the latter seem to suppose something outside God,
something not depending on God, to which God in acting
attends as a model and at which God aims as at a goal. This
is simply to subject God to fate [Latin fatum, here = ‘something
independently fixed and given’]. Nothing more absurd can be
maintained about God—shown by me to be the first and only
free cause of the essence of all things and of their existence.
I shan’t waste any more time refuting this absurdity.
34: God’s power is God’s essence itself.
It follows purely from the necessity of God’s essence
that God is the cause of God (by 11) and (by 16 and
its corollary) the cause of all things. So God’s power,
by which God and all things exist and act, is God’s
essence itself.
35: Whatever we conceive to be in God’s power, necessarily
exists.
Whatever is in God’s power must (by 34) be so related
to God’s essence that it necessarily follows from it,
and therefore necessarily exists.
36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does
not follow.
Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of
God in a certain and determinate way (by the corollary
to 25), that is, whatever exists expresses in a certain
and determinate way the power of God, which is the
cause of all things. So (by 16) from everything that
exists some effect must follow.

(09-04-2018, 11:34 AM)Stranger Wrote: [ -> ]Nau7ik, do you think that you are actually separate from the Creator right now? That you have somehow really split off from the Oneness in some fundamental way? Or can you consider the possibility that Oneness is the fundamental, fundamentally unalterable Truth of being - and, therefore, any separation is an illusion of separation? And yes, this illusion of separation does allow you to fully believe and act as if you were "a young Creator", but underneath it all - in the True Reality that you've temporarily been cut off from perceiving - you are, have ever been, and will ever be One with the All That Is, eternally whole and indivisible? That, therefore, you are THE Creator and can never possibly actually be anyone else, regardless of your perception otherwise?

What do you think?

No I do not think we are separate from the Creator right now lol. I think you’re misunderstanding me. We are the Creator. Our perception of that is not aware right now, but our essence is the Creator. The Divine Spark, the Yechida. Without it we could not be.

What I am saying by “young Creator” is that we are still at the beginning of our evolutionary journey in 3D. We have not returned to Source. We have not completed our journey which we had set out to do by the process of manifestation / Creation. We are not omnipresent or omniscient at this present moment. We presently walk the path of incarnation / manifestation in order to experience ourselves, to know ourselves and to BECOME ourselves.

But we are young right now. We have much to learn. Our journey has just begun. Ra is a late sixth density SMC. They are closer to that realization of Creatorhood than we humans are. Our essence is the same. they’ve simply walked further down the path than we have.

That’s where I am coming from when I say young Creators. I don’t disagree with anything you’re saying so this kind of puzzled me.

Sorry for my miscomprehension of your words and perspective, Nau7ik, and thanks for the clarification.

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

I have doubts similar to this really come to surface after reading Ra. I think part of the paradox of being at this state of being is the very fact of being at odds with God. I think the philosophical and emotional conflict with the idea that a God would do this on purpose is at the very core of this experience. In other words i think embodying the great conflict here with god is a sure sign we are where we need to be. We are truley in a deep illusion of separation. We have deep anger at god and an inability to really fathom. But in our small own ways can see how catalyst does work. I think of jesus's last words on the cross. In his great moment of doubt right before death, as a perfect example of how important this human quest and doubt is. To be god and to not know. To be god and to not be able to fathom- i mean this is what we are!!! I think perhaps god itself is not really an intellectual force. Perhaps the intellect is a very primitive tool indeed. My heart understands catalyst more than my mind. My mind has a bone or two to pick with god. I've seen too much suffering.

(09-05-2018, 09:58 PM)Taralie Peterdaughter Wrote: [ -> ]

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

I have doubts similar to this really come to surface after reading Ra.  I think part of the paradox of being at this state of being is the very fact of being at odds with God.  I think the philosophical and emotional conflict with the idea that a God would do this on purpose is at the very core of this experience.  In other words i think embodying the great conflict here with god is a sure sign we are where we need to be.  We are truley in a deep illusion of separation.  We have deep anger at god and an inability to really fathom.  But in our small own ways  can see how catalyst does work.  I think of jesus's last words on the cross.  In his great moment of doubt right before death, as a perfect example of how important this human quest and doubt is.  To be god and to not know. To be god and to not be able to fathom- i mean this is what we are!!! I think perhaps god itself is not really an intellectual force.  Perhaps the intellect is a very primitive tool indeed.  My heart understands catalyst more than my mind.  My mind has a bone or two to pick with god.  I've seen too much suffering.

Agree on the sometimes unbearable suffering we can witness, easily today with documentaries or news, so unbearable that we may even shut off tv, or imagine their suffering by empathy often quite unbearable too. But Taralie would you sometimes envision the unknown fact that for exemple such suffering entity may have in fact designed this incarnation, and this catalyst, and might in fact perhaps be progressing this way through densities, or at least through 3rd density so much faster ? It doesn't exclude our empathy/compassion/connected feeling, but somehow could balance our feeling towards a god who would allow such ?

Welcome Kevin Air!

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

1. Suffering in creation (on Earth)

Hatonn said (in channelings) it is not supposed to be like this here on Earth. It's not God's desire and it's not necessary. This is where we chose to wander. Unlike most other parts of the creation man became isolated and close minded:

Quote:We are not attempting to change the thinking of our Creator. We are only attempting to bring His ideas to some of the more isolated parts for their inspection and appraisal. Isolated parts, I say, my friends, and why should we consider these parts to be isolated? We consider them isolated because from our point of view they have chosen to wander far from the concept that we have found to permeate most of the parts of the creation with which we are familiar. We find, my friends, that man upon planet Earth in his experiences and experiments has become isolated in his thinking and has divorced it from that to which we are accustomed in the vast reaches of creation which we have experienced.

Quote:As long as your objectives lie within this physical illusion it will be necessary for you to be subject to the laws which prevail within this illusion. If your desires can be altered by the application of what you are learning and are lifted in the creation of the Infinite One, then, my friends, you may have a great deal more ability to remove yourself from the corners into which the illusion seems to back you.

See also: https://www.bring4th.org/forums/showthre...?tid=16148

2. I as (one with) Creator

It depends what is meant with "I". My surface self (ego, personality) or my inner self.

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent?

Creator cannot "be this or that".

Creator is.

We can't grasp what is being done even at level or two above us. This may be beyond understanding, too complex.

For instance, can you make ants understand The Law of One? Very unlikely. Can you dig ant's house and move them away if you see flood water approaching. But why are they suffering from you so much?

Why are you suffering? Your mochachinno froppachino latte isn't cold enough?
Are you being beaten up daily by someone? No? Hmm.

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

I believe a key misunderstanding, or misconception is that there is no other. Who experiences every nexus? The One The Only Infinite One.

What you are saying could only be true if the creator was separate from all this, and dictating over an other. There is Only One, there is no separation. We our partaking in the great illusion of separation.

There our other-selves in the illusion of separation. In truth there is only Creator. There our no others.

Creator wants to experience the all of it. I feel sure of that As Infinite Unity says, there is no separation.

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

The material clearly indicates that 3rd to 6.5 density STS life was not conceived of as being possible before the experiment with the veil so our creator is a "First time god" so certainly its possible and from what we look at it it seems so naive that being full STS is entirely within the realm of possibilty as it did not consider other selves wanting to "overtake" it as soon as given freedom it does not well understand other selves.

Edit: Any relation to Shin-ar a poster that was here earlier?

Creator is everything so he is all love but wishing to know himself of all facets, at the same time he is beyond considering himself STO or STS because he is All that is which we.. are too. , but we play the game in 3D to not be quite aware of this, which is pretty cool if you ask me

(09-03-2018, 05:46 PM)KevinAir Wrote: [ -> ]After reading all the Ra sessions I am wondering if this creator isn't an entity that is utter STS. If this being created all there is, and it decided to know itself through what it made, did it know that it's creation would suffer both physically and every other way? Would that make this Creator non-benevolent? Also, if we are all one, then that makes us also the one infinite creator as well, correct? Or are we co-creators and that's it?

Any thoughts that would help me with this?

(12-17-2018, 02:48 AM)flow Wrote: [ -> ]http://www.llresearch.org/transcripts/is..._1003.aspx

Quote:...We would bring to your attention the one known as Mahatma Gandhi. We have spoken before of this entity. This was an entity who was very clever in ways which are, for the most part, reserved for those of service to self in their philosophy. Yet, this entity’s vision was powerful in its unity and it refused to allow any thinking which closed the heart against any, even those which this entity perceived, with some justification, as suborning and limiting the rights of his own people...

http://www.llresearch.org/transcripts/is..._0116.aspx

Quote:...The other character whose name we would mention at this time is that of Mahatma Gandhi. This entity was an entity which came into incarnation to work upon that balance between love and wisdom as a sixth-density wanderer. ...

http://www.llresearch.org/transcripts/is..._0525.aspx

Quote:...These two great faiths, the Hindu and the Muslim, had through the actions and the service of the one known as Gandhi been able to appreciate this entity’s open heart to the degree that they were willing to set aside age-old differences in order that this entity whom they revered so greatly might stop his fast and continue to live among them. For it is well perceived, when there is an entity such as the one known as Gandhi who has opened his heart to that degree, that there is no boundary beyond which love cannot be given. This entity was successful in opening his own heart so that the will of love moved through him in a way which was easily recognized by those whose lives he touched...

this looks rather contradicting, and yet somehow it feels to me that Gandhi can indeed be STS. but how his heart be open then?

Expecting a benevolent creator sounds like the expectation of self-focused or childish societies. Creator has to be benevolent, for, well, it has to give things to those sentients, right...

Creator is a sum of all entities, a unified collective, if you will. Its in the past, present and future. And what it does to create the given reality, provide all the possibilities and tools to the best point to which they were discovered, and leave the entities which chose to manifest in that reality to do what they want.

It provides the means for any experience. The rest, entities create themselves.

 
Our own Logos is said to have a bias for kindness, but that does not mean the One Creator has the same bias.  Although we should not forget that in order to be STS you have to block a part of your nature (the Heart).  The One Creator is not blocking anything and so cannot be STS.